|
July 2003
The
Ultimate Balancing Act?
Strangers Bearing Gifts From
Afar...Every quarter in the subscriber portion of the site we
try to take a little peek at total money flows supporting Treasury
securities, government agency paper, US corporate paper and US
common stocks. In its Flow of Funds report, the Fed is kind
enough to treat us to this data. Although there are
certainly a fair number of revisions each quarter, we believe
watching these numbers is important in trying to get a sense of
capital flow trends as they pertain to US financial asset
prices. Moreover, a birds eye view of these numbers allows
us to see just who has been responsible for strength in purchasing
each asset class at the margin. What we hope to do each
quarter is get ourselves thinking about the possibilities for why
recent patterns of asset purchases have taken place and what
potential for change may lie ahead.
Particularly important in this
data over the past half decade has been the growing purchases of
US financial assets by the foreign community. At least in
absolute dollar terms, the following chart of net foreign capital
flows into US financial assets simply stands as testimony.

As we have written about in
prior discussions, there is no mystery as to why this has
happened. Suffice it to say that the existing US trade
imbalance has put a lot of paper dollars in the hands of the
foreign community. Moreover, with a global economy fairly
dangerously dependent on the US consumer, inflows of foreign
capital to US financial markets over the recent past has helped
keep domestic financing costs low (higher domestic bond prices and
lower yields) and the dollar relatively strong against foreign
currencies (at least up until the last eighteen months or
so). As we have mentioned a number of times, foreign
countries are in effect doing a bit of vendor financing when it
comes to the US trade imbalance and the global recycling of trade
related dollars (global savings) back into US financial
assets. At least for the moment, it seems pretty hard to
identify just who does not have a vested interest in continuing
this great recycling operation.
Again, many a foreign economy
is extremely dependent on the US consumer import market.
Quid pro quo, of course, being the reinvestment of trade dollars
back into US financial assets in support of further US
consumption. The US monetary authorities love the help they
receive in enhancing domestic liquidity prospects via the
enticement of cheap financing costs in part driven by foreign
purchases of US fixed income assets. The Administration
simply points to the data and characterizes the trade imbalance as
proof in the pudding that the US is a great place in which to
invest, hence their rather benign reaction to a weakening of the
dollar relative to foreign currencies. We all know that this
significant imbalance is simply that - a significant
imbalance. How and when it is ultimately reconciled remains
open to question. The fact that it will be reconciled is
much less open to question.
Let's have a quick look at each
financial asset class and just who has been doing the buying over
the last few years:
US TREASURY
MARKET
According to the folks at the
Fed, the largest buyers by far of US Treasury paper over the last
two years has been the foreign community. As of the close of
the first quarter, foreigners owned close to 33% of total US
Treasury securities. As you will see in the chart below,
this is up substantially from the middle part of the last
decade. As a quick tangent, it's somewhat ironic that
certain members of the foreign community were at odds with US
involvement in Iraq while simultaneously they weren't at all
at odds with the financing of that activity, now were they?

As you can see in the table
below, over the last two years, no one was even close to the
foreign community in terms of Treasury purchases. In
absolute dollar terms, foreigners purchased four times more
Treasury securities than all other classes of buyers combined.
|
Quarterly
Net Purchases Of US Treasuries ($billions) |
|
Sector |
2Q 01 |
3Q 01 |
4Q 01 |
1Q 02 |
2Q 02 |
3Q 02 |
4Q 02 |
1Q 03 |
TOTAL |
| |
|
Household |
$(45.6) |
$17.3 |
$(19.0) |
$13.2 |
$36.6 |
$23.8 |
$(74.5) |
$(28.6) |
$(76.8) |
|
NonFinl
Corp. |
1.1 |
(0.2) |
1.8 |
3.1 |
1.5 |
(0.3) |
(0.3) |
(1.2) |
5.7 |
|
State&Local
Govt |
4.2 |
11.3 |
7.7 |
3.9 |
7.0 |
1.8 |
5.0 |
(1.6) |
39.3 |
|
Foreign |
(35.4) |
0.4 |
44.0 |
(7.9) |
21.8 |
54.3 |
40.3 |
35.4 |
152.9 |
|
Comml.
Bank |
5.8 |
4.2 |
(12.1) |
(3.2) |
21.3 |
9.5 |
15.4 |
0.8 |
41.3 |
|
Savings
Institutions |
(0.5) |
(0.9) |
4.8 |
2.7 |
(1.4) |
(2.4) |
(1.1) |
0 |
1.2 |
|
Credit
Unions |
(1.4) |
(0.1) |
1.0 |
0.2 |
0.2 |
0.4 |
(0.3) |
(0.3) |
(0.3) |
|
Trusts |
(1.2) |
(1.2) |
(1.2) |
(0.1) |
(0.1) |
(0.1) |
(0.1) |
(0.1) |
(4.1) |
|
Life
Cos. |
(1.0) |
(1.0) |
(1.5) |
4.0 |
3.4 |
5.4 |
3.9 |
4.1 |
17.3 |
|
Other
Ins. Cos. |
0 |
(0.3) |
0.5 |
2.7 |
2.7 |
2.4 |
3.2 |
2.3 |
13.5 |
|
Private
Pensions |
1.5 |
(2.6) |
1.0 |
2.1 |
2.5 |
2.1 |
2.8 |
2.7 |
12.1 |
|
Public
Pensions |
9.1 |
(16.7) |
(10.3) |
9.6 |
(9.8) |
(3.1) |
2.2 |
2.0 |
(13.9) |
|
Money
Mkt Funds |
11.4 |
16.7 |
9.9 |
3.3 |
0.8 |
(7.6) |
7.8 |
7.8 |
50.1 |
|
Mutual
Funds |
(0.5) |
(6.0) |
2.8 |
5.0 |
2.0 |
7.3 |
4.1 |
14.4 |
29.1 |
|
Closed
End Funds |
(0.5) |
0 |
0.9 |
0.4 |
(2.3) |
0 |
(1.2) |
(0.7) |
(2.8) |
|
GSE's |
10.2 |
(4.5) |
(5.4) |
0.9 |
(16.5) |
(0.7) |
(8.5) |
0.8
|
(23.7) |
|
Brokers
& Dealers |
(16.9) |
34.0 |
(34.9) |
(49.9) |
59.2 |
(44.6) |
21.5 |
(20.0)
|
(51.6) |
|
ETF's |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2.1 |
(0.1) |
(0.5)
|
1.5 |
Government Agency
Market
To suggest that the foreign
community has been a meaningful supporter of the balance sheet
expansion of the federal government agency entities over the
recent past is an understatement. As you can see in the
following chart, foreign ownership of US government agency paper
has been steadily increasing as a percentage of total agency paper
outstanding over each and every year of the last eight (at least).

It just so happens that this is
the one segment of the US financial asset spectrum where the
foreign community has not been the top gun purchaser of assets
over the last two years, but darn close. Agencies purchasing
the paper of other agencies has topped the scales. We know
that current controversy surrounds Freddie Mac. But given
the fact that the FHLB (Federal Home Loan Bank) has purchased gobs
of Freddie paper over the last "x" years, if Freddie has
a problem, then so does the Home Loan Bank. And the
crossholdings of GSE paper don't stop there. In a sense, the
GSE's are involved in their own little debt instrument version of
keiretsu.
The other significant
non-foreign buyer of government agency paper over the last few
years has been the US commercial banking system. And it's no
wonder. As you know, government agency paper offers yields
greater than like maturity Treasuries while being accompanied by
the assumed perception of safety. Given that bank lending to
corporations has literally nose dived over the last three years,
now at absolute dollar levels not seen since 1998, putting capital
to work in alternatives such as government agency paper is no
surprise at all. But ultimately, banks will be fair weather
friends to vehicles such as agency paper. Here are the
numbers for the last eight quarters:
|
US
Govt. Agency Securities Quarterly Net Purchases
($billions) |
|
Sector |
2Q 01 |
3Q 01 |
4Q 01 |
1Q 02 |
2Q 02 |
3Q 02 |
4Q 02 |
1Q 03
|
TOTAL |
| |
|
Household |
$0.1 |
$25.7 |
$(21.5) |
$(26.7) |
$(14.0) |
$(67.6) |
$(12.9) |
$(60.9) |
$(177.8) |
|
NonFinl
Corp |
1.7 |
0.6 |
3.5 |
1.2 |
0 |
(1.9) |
(1.8) |
3.0 |
6.3 |
|
State&Local
Govt |
10.7 |
8.2 |
1.5 |
2.0 |
3.3 |
(1.5) |
0.3 |
(11.1) |
13.4 |
|
Foreign |
23.7 |
19.1 |
35.7 |
10.0 |
38.9 |
32.8 |
16.5 |
34.7 |
211.4 |
|
Comml.
Bank |
(15.1) |
35.5 |
41.7 |
30.9 |
48.6 |
33.0 |
28.0 |
45.3 |
247.9 |
|
Savings
Institutions |
5.4 |
(1.9) |
12.6 |
12.2 |
(1.0) |
(4.1) |
7.6 |
10.0 |
40.8 |
|
Credit
Unions |
(2.6) |
(9.7) |
7.8 |
7.2 |
(1.7) |
5.6 |
5.7 |
6.8 |
19.1 |
|
Trusts |
(2.6) |
(2.6) |
(2.6) |
(0.2) |
(0.2) |
(0.2) |
(0.2) |
(1.2) |
(9.8) |
|
Life
Cos. |
4.7 |
5.5 |
3.0 |
14.4 |
12.9 |
17.5 |
14.6 |
4.1 |
76.7 |
|
Other
Ins. Cos. |
0 |
4.5 |
3.4 |
1.9 |
1.9 |
1.2 |
2.5 |
2.6 |
18.1 |
|
Private
Pensions |
3.8 |
(1.1) |
1.8 |
1.5 |
0.9 |
3.1 |
(2.4) |
(1.1) |
6.5 |
|
Public
Pensions |
14.4 |
(20.4) |
(1.7) |
(2.9) |
0.2 |
0.4 |
1.9 |
(1.7) |
(9.8) |
|
Money
Mkt Funds |
19.6 |
44.1 |
(15.4) |
7.3 |
(12.8) |
8.0 |
(4.8) |
9.5 |
55.5 |
|
Mutual
Funds |
34.1 |
23.6 |
8.8 |
15.5 |
6.1 |
22.8 |
12.7 |
7.8 |
131.4 |
|
GSE's |
38.8 |
50.4 |
35.0 |
78.6 |
7.2 |
25.6 |
66.7 |
15.5 |
317.8 |
|
ABS
Issuers |
3.7 |
9.4 |
17.1 |
17.5 |
10.6 |
22.0 |
19.6 |
17.0 |
116.9 |
|
Brokers
& Dealers |
21.1 |
(15.9) |
(2.7) |
(6.0) |
18.1 |
(1.1) |
3.0 |
36.3 |
52.8 |
|
REIT's |
3.6 |
0.9 |
2.0 |
5.7 |
3.4 |
1.9 |
(2.9) |
(3.7) |
10.9 |
CORPORATE DEBT
Simply put, foreign buyers of
US corporate paper have dominated the space over the last few
years. And much like the experience with government agency
paper, they have become progressively larger owners of total US
corporate paper outstanding since the middle part of the last
decade. For now, the foreign community owns approximately
21% of total US corporate debt. Where the US commercial
banking system has had increasingly less to do with financing
corporate debt over the last three years, the capital markets have
filled the void. And the foreign community has been a big
buyer.

It's certainly clear that the
scramble for yield is really global in nature these days.
Foreign investors in US corporate paper have lived through the
Enron's, Worldcom's, KMart's, UAL's, a record number of bond
rating agency downgrades, etc. and have barely even blinked.
Foreign purchases of US corporate debt in 1Q was near top
quarterly absolute dollar purchase levels of the last few
years. But as you will see in the table below, the scramble
for yield is not confined to the foreign community. Much
like their Japanese brethren a decade back, insurance companies
are seeking out higher rates of return with relative vigor.
Although still meaningful, they were not dominant players in terms
of the purchasing of UST's and government agency debt, preferring
yet higher yielding corporate debt securities to increase yield in
their investment portfolios over the last few years. Lastly,
households and mutual funds have increasingly been notable buyers
of corporate debt during the last eight quarters. Not
surprising given the record inflow to bond mutual funds in the US
over the last three years.
|
Quarterly
Net Purchases of US Corporate Debt ($billions) |
|
Sector |
2Q 01 |
3Q 01 |
4Q 01 |
1Q 02 |
2Q 02 |
3Q 02 |
4Q 02 |
1Q 03
|
TOTAL |
| |
|
Household |
$(3.3) |
$(37.8) |
$24.4 |
$16.1 |
$25.9 |
$(28.6) |
$97.5 |
$46.2 |
$140.4 |
|
State&Local
Govt |
1.8 |
3.7 |
1.0 |
3.8 |
3.3 |
(2.1) |
(0.8) |
(5.2) |
5.5 |
|
Foreign |
66.2 |
33.8 |
39.9 |
45.4 |
62.1 |
18.1 |
41.0 |
61.7 |
365.5 |
|
Comml.
Bank |
29.2 |
18.7 |
36.1 |
(2.7) |
(15.0) |
10.2 |
10.2 |
13.8 |
100.6 |
|
Savings
Institutions |
(2.8) |
(5.1) |
(4.3) |
(0.5) |
1.9 |
0.6 |
(6.0) |
2.0 |
(14.3) |
|
Trusts |
(1.7) |
(1.7) |
(1.7) |
(0.7) |
(0.7) |
(0.7) |
(0.7) |
(1.7) |
(9.6) |
|
Life
Cos. |
30.8 |
35.6 |
21.5 |
35.3 |
21.6 |
34.7 |
17.8 |
24.5 |
221.8 |
|
Other
Ins. Cos. |
0 |
3.3 |
4.1 |
0.6 |
0.4 |
(1.0) |
2.4 |
1.7 |
11.5 |
|
Private
Pensions |
4.4 |
2.4 |
(0.5) |
4.3 |
2.2 |
0.6 |
2.8 |
3.7 |
19.9 |
|
Public
Pensions |
(9.1) |
19.4 |
10.2 |
10.5 |
(3.6) |
(1.1) |
6.2 |
(3.2) |
29.3 |
|
Money
Mkt Funds |
(1.7) |
(5.5) |
8.5 |
(10.6) |
(11.1) |
12.1 |
17.3 |
12.2 |
21.2 |
|
Mutual
Funds |
16.1 |
8.0 |
19.2 |
21.3 |
18.0 |
6.7 |
4.7 |
21.2 |
115.2 |
|
Closed
End Funds |
(1.6) |
(0.6) |
1.4 |
2.6 |
1.3 |
(2.4) |
0.6 |
(0.9) |
0.4 |
|
GSE's |
10.1 |
(1.5) |
0.5 |
6.5 |
15.2 |
(5.1) |
(9.6) |
10.3 |
17.4 |
|
Brokers
& Dealers |
8.0 |
19.7 |
9.6 |
6.9 |
16.4 |
(2.8) |
10.2 |
(13.1) |
54.9 |
|
REIT's |
(2.3) |
0.8 |
1.4 |
0.4 |
1.2 |
1.6 |
1.5 |
(0.8) |
3.8 |
|
Funding
Cos. |
9.7 |
10.9 |
10.6 |
11.7 |
11.7 |
(7.7) |
(0.8) |
11.3 |
57.4 |
We've lead off this view of
capital flows with fixed income securities for a reason. The
tables you see above are in good part reflective of not just
investment activity, but of the expansion in the US credit cycle
over the last few years. Financed, of course, by the fine
participants you see above. Record foreign inflows into US
fixed income securities has been accompanied by record domestic
bond mutual fund purchases and significant increases in bank and
insurance company buying over the last eight quarters. All
of these buyers moving increasingly in the same direction.
Overlay the activities of the leveraged speculating community
(hedge funds, etc.) in this country and it's easy to understand
why credit quality has really taken a back seat to yield and sheer
momentum driven price performance in recent years.
If we had to single out one
reason as to why our economy has slowly trudged forward over the
last few years despite the once in a generation bursting of a
financial asset bubble, that reason is broader system wide cost of
capital. Cost of residential mortgage financing. Cost
of consumer credit. The cost of Federal debt. And cost
of corporate capital, especially in what have been the very
accommodative capital markets of the last half year or so.
And in virtually ranked order, here are the folks we need to thank
for their capital lending generosity. Their generosity in
parting with their own precious capital for stated coupon rates of
return that in many cases are as low as anything seen in three to
four decades.

In terms of US fixed income
instrument yields that ultimately set the cost of capital in this
country, just what would our economy look like today had it not
been for strangers bearing gifts from afar over the last two to
three years (let alone the last decade)? But this does point
up a question about "tomorrow". As we mentioned,
the confluence of US fixed income buyers, domestic and foreign,
acting in similar manner has helped create the following
multi-decade round trip.

But what happens as the secular
bull market in US fixed income vehicles ultimately comes to a
conclusion? As you can see from the graphs and tables above,
a lot of folks are lined up on the same side of the trade right
here. Recently encouraged by the Fed's jawboning campaign on
deflation and implied promises to buy longer term debt securities
if need be. But at least over the last few weeks, global
debt markets have been sending signals that change may be in the
wind.
To us, the global bond markets
are suggesting one of two things. They are potentially
trying to tell us that the global campaign to reinflate is either
beginning to head in the right direction, or that global credit
risk is building in a very unacceptable manner given that
liquidity is literally being force fed into the system, regardless
of sound credit risk characteristics among a good number of
borrowers. After all, how else could a company like a Yahoo
finance convertible debt on a zero coupon basis? If either
of these two thoughts regading reinflation or credit risk are
correct, this one way directional buying of US fixed income assets
may have seen its best days (although we're sure the Fed has yet
to attempt to have the last word in terms of unconventional
monetary warfare). Although we have long described the
ultimate balancing act as characterizing the US trade imbalance,
maybe the more important balancing act to come relates to whether
foreign buyers of US fixed income assets will continue their push
forward in supporting US debt markets to theoretically further the
cause of their export industries, in spite of what may turn out to
be a secular conclusion to the US bond and interest rate bull
market.
Could the US financial markets
tolerate a slowdown in foreign purchases of US debt
instruments? Would that complicate the best laid plans of
the Fed? Now that the Fed has largely used up its
conventional monetary weaponry against a slowing economy, would
they possibly be forced to move toward unconventional means of
accommodation, such as pegging longer term yields, if the foreign
community choose to take a few steps back from their as of late US
financial asset purchasing leadership role? It just so
happens that in April (post the 1Q Fed Flow of Funds data),
foreign buying of US Treasuries dropped significantly relative to
what had been happening year-to-date. Of course this is only
one month's data.
We may be getting close to the
time when the Fed may either have to put up or shut up. The
warning shot in the bond market of the last few weeks just may be
the market's way of suggesting to the Fed that they get on with
supposed unconventional action as opposed to continued promises,
threats and jawboning. And if a scenario like this comes to
pass, monitoring foreign flows of capital may be more critical
than ever since potential change at the margin in the buying
habits of the single largest buyer of US debt instruments over the
last few years would be more than meaningful. Unconventional
Fed monetary warfare would necessarily mean a big expansion in the
monetary aggregates (M3, M2, MZM, etc.). In essence, this
type of activity would be an open and outright
"dilution" of the dollar, especially in the eyes of
foreign holders of dollar denominated assets. Would foreign
money continue to be lavished so generously upon the US fixed
income markets if a scenario like this were to occur? It may
be well worth pondering because if the economy does not experience
the fables second half recovery, election concerns on the part of
the Administration may mean that the Fed is allowed leeway to move
on to Plan B in relatively short order - the unconventional
weaponry espoused by Greenspan, Bernanke, et al.
Alternatively, if some type of
recovery does transpire, the talk of deflation will have proven to
be an illusion. Either way, we have a lot of long bond
players potentially looking to be less long in simultaneous
fashion. As per the 1Q Flow of Funds data, the foreign
community just may be leading the pack of big US debt holders
pondering asset allocation, in spite of the fact that US trade
related dollars continue to swell their holdings of foreign
reserves. Remember, we're not suggesting that foreigners
will sell their dollar denominated financial assets en
masse. That's probably not realistic under any scenario
except an outright panic. It's the potential slowing of
foreign purchases of US fixed income assets that carries the most
weight with us. Especially because it would probably occur
within the context of the leveraged speculating community
being forced into a bit of liquidation.
COMMON STOCKS
Finally, here's a little look
at purchases of US common stocks by sector over the last two
years. It is clear that despite the foreign community having
cumulatively been the largest buyer of US common stocks over the
last eight quarters, the peak in quarterly buying by the foreign
community happened a good number of quarters back. Purchases
of US equities by the foreign community has been incredibly
subdued over the last four quarters. And, in the scramble in
terms of hoped for rate of return, insurance companies have been
one of the most significant buyers at the margin recently.
|
Quarterly
Net Purchases Of US Equities ($billions) |
|
Sector |
2Q 01 |
3Q 01 |
4Q 01 |
1Q 02 |
2Q 02 |
3Q 02 |
4Q 02 |
1Q03
|
TOTAL |
| |
|
Household |
$(30.7) |
$(52.3) |
$(71.3) |
$(38.8) |
$(19.2) |
$(44.5) |
$(7.4) |
$9.2 |
$(255.0) |
|
State&Local
Govt |
5.1 |
5.4 |
5.8 |
3.2 |
6.8 |
0.9 |
(1.7) |
3.1 |
28.6 |
|
Foreign |
34.7 |
13.7 |
33.2 |
23.7 |
10.9 |
7.3 |
12.0 |
(2.0) |
133.5 |
|
Comml.
Bank |
(0.1) |
1.5 |
(0.8) |
(1.0) |
0.1 |
(0.1) |
0.4 |
0.2 |
0.2 |
|
Savings
Institutions |
0.8 |
0.6 |
0.7 |
0.3 |
0.5 |
0.5 |
0.7 |
(0.4) |
3.7 |
|
Trusts |
(8.1) |
(8.1) |
(8.0) |
(0.5) |
(0.5) |
(0.5) |
(0.2) |
(5.8) |
(31.8) |
|
Life
Cos. |
16.0 |
17.7 |
13.2 |
13.2 |
10.4 |
17.9 |
12.5 |
13.5 |
114.4 |
|
Private
Pensions |
| |